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Abstract
In a two-period, sunspot, pure-exchange economy we analyze the case in
which agents do not assign subjective probabilistic beliefs to the sunspot activ-
ity. Two generations, each of which is made up of identical agents, populate this
economy. The participation in the Arrow securities market is restricted and the
generation, which is allowed to trade in assets, can alternatively face uncertainty
via two distribution-free decision rules under complete ignorance(axiomatized
by Milnor (1954)): the minimax regret criterion(Savage (1954), ch.9) and the
maxmin return criterion(Wald (1950)). When the former is used, then sunspots
can matter. In particular we prove that, if the economy admits two Walrasian
equilibria, then a unique sunspot equilibrium always exists. We pin down this
equilibrium, determine the prices of the Arrow securities and show that, at these
prices, no trade in securities takes place. In the same framework we prove that,
with agents using the maxmin return criterion, sunspots do not matter.
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1 Introduction
In a seminal paper Cass and Shell (1983, JPE) prove that, in a simple general equilib-
rium model with overlapping generations, extrinsic uncertainty- that is, uncertainty
not a¤ecting fundamentals - may play a role in determining the equilibrium allocation.
In their model sunspots matterbecause the overlapping generations structure of the
model brings about restricted participation in the Arrow securities market1.
We develop a two-period pure-exchange general equilibrium model much in the
spirit of Cass and Shell (1983). Two generations, each of which is made up of identical
agents, populate the economy and the participation in the Arrow securities market is
restricted to the one born in the rst period.
Strong uncertaintyseems a promising way to qualify purely extrinsic uncertainty,
and to represent the possibility of an agents fuzzy perceptionof the sunspot activity2.
In our model the agents trading in assets do not assess subjectively the probability of
the realization of the di¤erent states of nature generated by extrinsic uncertainty.
In this choice scenario of complete ignorance (Luce and Rai¤a (1958)), these agents
can alternatively select their optimal consumption bundle via two non-probabilistic
decision rules: the minimax regret criterion(MR henceforth, Savage (1954), ch.9) and
the maxmin return criterion(MM, Wald (1950))3.
We show that, in a world populated by decision makers who care about minimizing
their maximum regret, sunspots matter. In particular, we prove that, in an economy
admitting two Walrasian equilibria, it is always possible to build a unique sunspot
equilibrium. We determine the equilibrium prices of the Arrow securities and show
that, at these prices, no trade in securities will take place. In the same framework we
prove that, with the agents confronting extrinsic uncertainty via the maxmin return
criterion, sunspots do not matter.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next Section we introduce the
two decision rules, the MR and the MM. Section 3 describes our simple pure-exchange
economy. In Section 4 we prove our results.
1In the same work the authors also prove that, even though participation is not restricted, sunspots
can matter if economic agents have heterogeneous beliefs on the sunspot activity.
2A contribution in this direction is Tallon (1998): in his model agents are assumed to be Choquet-
expected-utility maximizers (see Schmeidler (1989)).
3Both rules have been axiomatized by Milnor (1954). Interest in the maxmin has recently grown
since Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) provided an axiomatic extension of this criterion to a multiple-
prior framework. Much in the same spirit Hayashi (2005) has recently axiomatized minimax regret
and introduced the concept of regret aversion.
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2 The Minimax Regret Criterion (MR) and the
Maxmin Return Criterion (MM)
Decision makers (DMs) using the minimax regret criterion and those using the maxmin
return criterion have one salient feature in common: they determine their preference
order without forming any prior over the set of the states of nature. This characteristic
marks an essential di¤erence between these agents and the subjective expected utility
maximizers, who always assign probabilistic beliefs to the randomness which they face.
Formally there are two alternative sets of axioms that each uniquely determine each
of the two criteria (Milnor (1954))4. The di¤erences in the two sets lie behind the
di¤erent choice behavior that each of them prescribes and that we are going to recall
briey in what follows.
A decision problem under uncertainty can be represented through a decision table,
such as the one below:
States of nature
Actions
S1 S2 ::: Sn
A1 c11 c12 ::: c1n
A2 c21 c22 ::: c2n
::: ::: ::: ::: :::
Am cm1 cm2 ::: cmn
Table 1. The generic decision table.
where Ai (for i = 1; :::;m) represents the generic action, Sj (for j = 1; :::; n) repre-
sents the generic state of nature and cij is the consequence (pay-o¤) associated with
act i and state j. The decision process driven by the MR can now be split in three
stages. In the rst stage, the DM computes the regret associated with any given pair
action/state by subtracting the consequence corresponding to that pair from the best
consequence that is achievable in the same state, that is:
rij = max
l2[1;m]
fcljg   cij
4Given a set of six common axioms, maxmin builds on the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives,
while minimax regret only satises a weaker version of that axiom, the Independence of Never Best
Reply, plus an axiom, called by Milnor (1954) Column Linearity, which in turn is not satised by
maxmin.
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The result of this process is the matrix of regrets, which by construction has the
same dimension as the starting decision table. In the second stage the DM associates
with each action the maximum regret over all states of nature, that is:
i = max
j2[1;n]
frijg
Finally she selects the action for which the maximum regret (associated with each
action) is the smallest, that is:
choose Ak such that k = min
i2[1;m]
fig = min
i2[1;m]

max
j2[1;n]
frijg

(MR)
Hence an MR agent does not care about the outcome per se but about not missing
protable opportunities. Regret exactly measures the loss associated with making the
wrong choicefor given state of nature: the agent chooses the action which minimizes
that loss.
With the maxmin return criterion, the DM for each action identies the worst
possible state (that is, the state associated with the minimum pay-o¤):
si = min
j2[1;n]
fcijg
where si is usually called the security levelof action Ai. Then she chooses the
action for which this security level is the highest:
choose Ak such that sk = max
i2[1;m]
fsig = max
i2[1;m]

min
j2[1;n]
fcijg

(MM)
The maximin agent has thus a highly conservativeattitude towards uncertainty,
and acts as if the worst state of nature were certain to occur. The fear of being punished
by a malevolent Natureleads her to choose the best action under the worst casebelief.
Intutively, while minimax regret is associated with aversion to lost opportunities,
maxmin is associated with extreme pessimism.
3 The Model
We consider a simple pure-exchange economy lasting two periods,  = 0; 1 and charac-
terized by l commodities, and two states of nature, s = ; . The uncertainty generated
by the existence of these two states is extrinsic, in the sense that it does not a¤ect
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any fundamentals (preferences and endowments). There are two distinct generations
of identical agents5, G0 born in period 0 and living to the end of time, and G1 born in
period 1 and also living to the end of time. The agents of both generations evaluate
their consumption bundles via smooth, strictly increasing and strictly concave utility
functions Uh ()  Uh ()  Uh() for h = G0,G1. Endowments are represented by the
vector !h(s)  !h, while consumption bundles by xh(s), for h = G0; G1, s = ; . We
denote the prices of the l commodities as the vector pc(s).
The timing of the model is the same as in Cass and Shell (1983). After their birth
in period 0, the agents of generation G0 are allowed to trade in Arrow securities, which
are contingent upon the realization of the extrinsic random variable. The amount of
the s-contingent security bought - sold, if negative - by agent h in G0 is bh(s) and its
price is pb(s). At the end of period 0, before the birth of generation G1, sunspot activity
is observed (that is, people realize which state of nature has actually occurred). When
both generations are alive in period 1, they trade in spot commodities and, nally,
consume their bundles. As is well known, with completely extrinsic uncertainty, if an
equilibrium exists in which xh() 6= xh() for some h, then sunspots matter.
4 The Search for Sunspot Equilibria under MR and
MM
Suppose that, for given fundamentals, the economy described above admits two dis-
tinct Walrasian equilibria, and that the extrinsic uncertaintythat the agents in G0
perceive corresponds to these two equilibria. We then index them as equilibrium 
with quantities and prices respectively given by xh(); p

c(), and equilibrium `with
quantities and prices respectively given by xh(); p

c(), for h in G0,G1.
Agents in G0 do not know the probability distribution over the two states of nature
,, and their choice under complete ignorance is alternatively driven by the MR
and the MM. Let us verify whether any other - sunspot-driven - equilibrium exists in
this economy. Since G1-type agents make their consumption choices after extrinsic
uncertaintyhas been resolved, they simply maximize their utility function under the
usual budget constraints. On the contrary, G0- agents can trade in Arrow securities
and, then, must decide whether and, possibly, which amount bh(s) of assets to buy/sell
5That is to say, the identical agents of one generation are di¤erent from the identical agents of the
other.
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in period 0, before sunspot activity is revealed.
Let us dene the state-contingent pay-o¤s among which agent h inG0 can choose. If
agent h selects her optimal amount bh() of Arrow security for a given price vector pb(),
the pay-o¤ she obtains can be summarized by the following indirect utility functions:
vh = vh [pc(); pc()!h + bh()] if  occurs and:
vh = vh [pc(); pc()!h + bh()] if  occurs
where:
 !hpc()  bh() =  bh()pb()
pb()
 pc()!h pb()
pb()
In particular, if this agent decides to employ all her income in buying a positive
amount of -contingent security at the price pb(), her return is6:
v
(max)
h = vh

pc(); !h

pc() +
pb()
pb()
pc()

if state  occurs and
vh[pc(); 0]
if state  occurs. Analogously, if she decides to employ all her income in buying a
positive amount of -contingent security at the price pb(), her return is:
v
(max)
h = vh

pc(); !h

pc() +
pb()
pb()
pc()

if state  occurs and
6These functions are determined by solving, for s; t = ;  and s 6= t the following maximum
problem:
max
xh
U [xh(s)]
s.t. pc(s)xh(s) = pc(s)!h + bh(s);
s.t. bh(s) = pc(t)!h
pb(t)
pb(s)
:
6
vh[pc(); 0]
if state  occurs.
Finally, if agent h in G0 does not trade in assets, the utilities she gains are those
associated with the two deterministic equilibria: Uh[xh()] if  occurs and Uh[x

h()] if
 occurs.
It is now possible to dene the expression vs(max)h  vsh as the generic regret associated
with an amount bh() of Arrow security for agent h when state s has occurred. In a
general equilibrium framework the optimization under uncertainty via the MR requires
that all the regrets be equalized across all states of nature. With two states the following
optimum conditionmust hold:
v
(max)
h   vh = v(max)h   vh (1)
Just to give an intution to the equation above, refer to table 2 and suppose that, for
a given price, agent h has bought an amount of Arrow security ~bh() > 0 such that
v
(max)
h   ~vh > v(max)h   ~vh . Since an increase in utility in state  () is inevitably
associated with a decrease in state  () - for the obvious reason that, in order to
buy one asset you must sell the other -, and since what matters under the MR is the
maximum regret across the states, agent h would nd it protable to start selling that
security until the two regrets would converge towards each other. Only when (1) holds
exactly, there is no more incentive to trade in assets, as the maximum regret is at its
minimum.
 
b
(max)
h () v
(max)
h vh[pc(); 0]
b
(max)
h () vh[pc(); 0] v
(max)
h
~bh() ~v

h ~v

h
bh() vh vh
::: ::: :::
Table 2. The choice of Arrow Securities
Analogously the optimum conditionunder MM requires that the minima be di-
rectly equalized across all states of nature. With two states only, the condition is:
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vh = v

h (2)
We can now state the two following propositions.
Proposition 1 If agents in G0 make use of the minimax regret criterion, a unique
sunspot equilibrium always exists in the economy. The vector of the equilibrium prices
of the Arrow securities [pb(); p

b()] is such that no trade in Arrow securities takes
place in equilibrium, i.e. bh(s) = 0. Moreover, the prices of the l commodities,
[pc(); p

c()], and the consumption allocations, x

h = [x

h();x

h()] for h in G0; G1,
are those corresponding to the two Walrasian equilibria.
Proof. We prove our result in two stages. In the rst we show that, if an equilibrium
exists, it must be characterized by no trade in Arrow securities. In the second this
equilibrium is pinned down and the equilibrium prices of Arrow securities are found.
1. By denition of Arrow securities, an equilibrium must be characterized by:
X
h2G0
bh(s) = 0 for s = ;  (3)
Moreover, since agents in G0 are identical, then in equilibrium all individuals choose
the same unique optimal portfolio. Hence:
bh(s) = b(s) 8h in G0 (4)
Eq.s (3) and (4) imply bh(s) = 0. Then, if an equilibrium exists, it must be
characterized by no trade in Arrow securities.
2. Indeed, the unique consumption allocation compatible with no trade in Arrow
securities is the pair xh = [x

h();x

h()]. Now we prove that a vector of Arrow se-
curitiesprices pb = [p

b(); p

b()] always exists, which renders the vectors of prices
p = [pc(); p

c(); p

b(); p

b()] and of allocations x

h = [x

h();x

h()] for h in G0; G1
the unique sunspot equilibrium of our economy.
Since agents apply the MR, and since in equilibrium it holds pb() + pb() = 1,
Arrow securitiesprices are determined via the following system:(
v
(max)
h   Uh[xh()] = v(max)h   Uh[xh()]
pb() + pb() = 1
(5)
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The rst equation of system (5) equalizes the regret associated with the consump-
tion bundle x() to the one associated with x(). It is a special case of the optimum
conditionunder MR (equation (1)), obtained when bh(s) = 0.
Continuity and monotonicity of the utility function Uh(), for h in G0, constitute
su¢ cient conditions for the existence of a solution 0 < pb(s) < 1, for s = ; ; in
system (5). In fact (for a graphical intuition of this result see gure 1):
lim
pb()!0
v
(max)
h   Uh[xh()] > 0; lim
pb()!0
v
(max)
h   Uh[xh()] = 0
and:
lim
pb()!1
v
(max)
h   Uh[xh()] = 0; lim
pb()!1
v
(max)
h   Uh[xh()] > 0
Since it generically holds xh() 6= xh(), the equilibrium is characterized by sunspot
activity.
The theoretical underpinnings of the minimax regret criterion can give explanation
for a widespread attitude towards choice encountered in the real consumption mar-
kets. As recently pointed out by McFadden (2006), experimental evidence suggests the
prevalence of agoraphobic consumers, that is, of consumers who fear markets and nd
choice troubling. Agoraphobia, literally fear of the marketplace, refers exactly to
the sense of bewilderment and unease that the consumers experience when confronting
several alternatives of choice. This feeling is in fact a major characteristic of minimax-
regret agents. Unlike maxmin agents or Bayesians, who always weakly prefer that an
alternative be added to their set of actions, minimax-regret agents do not: for instance,
suppose they confront one action only (and, hence, have no real choice to make). In
that case they reach the minimum regret (equal to 0): any other action to be added
would weakly worsen them o¤ (weakly because adding up a dominated action would
leave them indi¤erent). The reason for their agoraphobia lies in the regret associated
with missing (possibly protable) opportunities: no opportunity means no trouble7. In
this choice scenario we have proven that purely extrinsic uncertainty may play a role
in the nal equilibrium allocation, and that the emergence of a social norm (sunspot)
may drive the agoraphobic agentsoptimal consumption choices.
Proposition 2 If agents make use of the maxmin return criterion, then sunspots do
7According to McFadden, agoraphobic consumers reason well in accord with a Dutch proverb
saying: He who has choice has trouble.
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Figure 1:
not matter.
Proof. The rst part of the proof is exactly the same as the one in the previous
proposition, in which we have shown that in equilibrium no trade in Arrow securities
can take place (bh(s) = 0). However, since in general U [xh()] 6= U [xh()], x =
[x();x()] cannot be the optimal solution for this decision rule (recall equation
(2)). In fact, for every vector of asset prices p0b, G0-agents would be better o¤ by
buying an amount of securities b0h() 6= 0 such that:8<: vh [pc(); pc()!h + b0h()] = vh

pc(); pc()!h   b0h()
p0b()
p0b()

pb() + pb() = 1
(6)
This conguration is however not sustainable in equilibrium, since it would imply
trade in asset markets, while it must necessarily be bh(s) = 0 8h in G0. Hence a
sunspot equilibrium does not exist.
We have proven that in our economy market equilibria among maxmin agents are
sunspot-free. The conservative attitude of these agents in the face of uncertainty and,
consequently, their willingness to insure completely are at the root of this immunity
result. Hence, extrinsic uncertainty will not a¤ect consumption choices and the nal
equilibrium allocation.
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